When to Inform Your Board

Hypo:  you are CEO at a venture backed company and you receive a term sheet from a potential investor that has unacceptable terms.  Do you share the term sheet with your board or do you try to negotiate it first and then disclose?  Not always an easy decision.

This is just one hypo out of many that address the same question, namely, when, as CEO, should you share a given piece of information with your board of directors (and let’s assume your company is venture backed and you have VCs and independent directors on your board)?

Let’s set the basics on two issues.  First, board members owe fiduciary duties to shareholders (and critically to common shareholders).  In order to exercise those duties (in particular the duty of care and duty of loyalty), board members must be fully informed.  For example, if the company is moving down a path with one party (for example, a strategic partnership) and then another alternative presents itself (a competing strategic option), the board will need to understand both alternatives in order to properly make decisions.

Second, the board is the ultimate decision maker at company on strategic issues and non “day to day” issues.  The board hires and fires the CEO.  The board hires and fires other officers (think VPs) after recommendations from the CEO.  The board approves financing and sale terms.  The board approves approves “important” agreements with third parties.  The board approves overall strategy and spending to execute.   The board approves “significant” deviations from budget.  These are just some examples.

But, what is “important” and what is “significant”?  In other words, what should the CEO necessarily present to the board members?  Unfortunately there is no bright line test, and answer falls into the same category as the infamous US Supreme Court text about pornography – “you know it when you see it”.  That is not always helpful to a CEO because different directors have different senses of sight.  And different CEOs will have different views of appropriate level of board member engagement.  Some will engage often on most issues and some will inform later on most issues.  And some will be in between.

If I were a CEO of a venture backed company, here is a disclosure test that I would try:  if i were a board member (and not CEO) would I like to know the given information from the CEO?   Just put yourself in the non-CEO board members’ shoes.  Keep in mind that disclosure can be painful for the CEO because disclosure will lead to questions and answering questions can be a time sink.  Yet this can be curtailed by qualifying the disclosure.  For example “here is a competing term sheet with some unacceptable terms as follows [X, Y and Z].  I am going to try to negotiate and see where it gets us.  It would be more productive to discuss after that happens, but if you have any input in the meantime, feel free to give it”.  Here the CEO has basically told the directors to stand down, but has also fully informed them.  To me that is a win-win.  This is important as I have seen situations where directors have wet noodled a CEO for not disclosing early enough.  The disclosure essentially protects the CEO from criticism and allows the directors to do their job.

So, not surprisingly as I am a board member for many companies, I think that disclosing early and often is safer and the more prudent course.  People will differ for sure on this point, but over communication to your board is rarely a bad idea.

This topic is complex, and I bet there will be more disclosure on it.

Management Carve Out Plan

A management carve out plan (MCOP) is a written obligation of the company that, in simple terms, provides that certain management members get a predetermined slice of proceeds when a company is sold.  The MCOP can serve a critical role as founders and other management team members are diluted down by rounds of financing or if their equity is not in the money.   Note that MCOPs are rare when the company is young and has only raised a limited amount of venture capital – no need yet for the carve out as the founders still own a large chunk of the company (thankfully).

A few key points to consider:

1.  As the investors’ aggregate liquidation preference (ALP) increases typically the need for a MCOP also increases.  The ALP is the total amount of $ that preferred stock holders are owed on a sale of the company under their liquidation preferences.  Often times this is simply the aggregate purchase price plus any accrued dividends (not typical for dividends to accrue, but watch out if they do!).  The more the company raises the higher the ALP, and thus the higher the hurdle before the common stock held by founders and stock options held by other employees are in the money.  Also, if the preferred stock carries a multiple liquidation preference (like 2X), then the ALP will obviously be more than the original purchase price.

2.  Is it unfair for the MCOP to provide that it only kicks in once the ALP is cleared (in other words once the sale price exceeds ALP)?  I have seen this many times, and as an investor I think it is fair in some circumstances, particularly when the ALP is not too high.  But, in any given situation, investors may want to motivate the management team in a sale situation.  Having to clear the ALP first could get in the way of motivation.  It is not uncommon for the MCOP to kick in from dollar one.  It all depends on the facts and circumstances at the time the MCOP is adopted.

3.  The MCOP is typically expressed as a percentage of net sale proceeds (often between 5% and 10%) and is clearly an obligation of the company.  A great question to consider is how the MCOP is allocated among management members.  I prefer to keep the allocations undefined and rather give the CEO the allocation power subject to Board approval at the time of the sale event.  That way the CEO is empowered and can allocate based on extremely current facts (as opposed to setting allocations well in advance of a sale event).   Yet sometimes it is necessary to allocate in advance to better align the interests of management team members.  Remember VC = OB (see earlier post from February 18, 2011).

4.  For clarity, the Board is the body that adopts the MCOP.  But when should the MCOP be adopted?  I prefer it to be adopted before the company is even put in play.  It is not uncommon, however, for it to be adopted at the time of the sale.  Consider who has the most bargaining power at the time of the sale.  It might be the management team or it might be the investors.  This will typically depend on how valuable the team is to the buyer and the success of the company.

5.  Finally, should the MCOP proceeds be decreased by the value of equity held by the management team members that benefit from the plan?  That does make sense and I have dealt with numerous VCs that insist on it.  The argument is that the MCOP is a backup plan to make sure that the management team members get what they bargained for in equity value.  For example, if the CEO bargained for 7% fully diluted, then the CEO should get 7% of the sales proceeds (assuming that any option exercise price is very low).  The MCOP could be used to fill that gap, particularly if allocations are done at the time of the sale transaction.  Anyway, good point to consider and netting out equity value from a MCOP payout accomplishes this.

The MCOP is a surprisingly complex topic.  You probably noticed above many flip-flops.  MCOP analysis is fact driven, and sometimes I cannot suppress the lawyer in me.

Contributing or Meddling

As a VC board member at a handful of companies, I think a lot about whether certain board member actions are contributing or meddling.  Where is the right line for the particular situation?  How will management react to a particular input?  What level of contact is right for the given management group?

It is an interesting and difficult situation.  I tend to be quick to fire off an email asking questions.  I tend to be quick to offer input.  It is often well received, but not always.  Often, in anticipation of an upcoming board meeting, I send the company’s CEO a bunch of questions via email.  Will they be answered prior to the meeting?  I am not sure, but I am glad that I wrote them down to give the CEO a better understanding of where my mind is at.

Open communication is critical and part of the VC = OB (see earlier post) puzzle.  Too much communication can be viewed as meddling.  I think, however, that VC board members are simply trying to contribute.  Wanting to contribute is a normal human response.  The fact that we have money at stake in a given company adds urgency to the “contribution” instinct.

In one extreme, a VC board member may literally talk with a CEO every day – with calls going both ways hopefully.  The team work feels great.  At the other end, at a different company, the same VC board member may only talk with the CEO every other week.  And the team work still feels great.  And there are times when communications are painful and stressful even when completely routine.

Bottom line:  find the right balance factoring in the mindset of the VC and the CEO.  Strike the right balance, but keep communicating always.