No Mess (Employment Agreements)

I thought it might be useful to start a blog series on stuff that VCs don’t like to see.  I know, some of you are laughing right now thinking “that will be an endless series…..”   I will pick random topics, but if you have any ideas, please let me know.

Today’s “No Mess” topic relates to restrictions on firing people.  Put simply, VCs like to see boards of directors that have maximum flexibility to terminate employees.  This relates to all levels of employees (not just senior execs).  Here are some examples of things that result in unattractive restrictions:

1.   Employment agreements:  if possible, avoid putting the phrase “employment agreements” and word “VCs” in the same sentence unless of course the sentence is “VCs really don’t like employment agreements.”   Employment agreements typically confer a severance payment to the employee (for example 3 months salary), and that means $ out the door (in other words an unattractive restriction).  Employment agreements, if they do exist, should always condition the payment of severance on the receipt of a written release from the employee and ideally an agreement not to compete as well.

2.  Employee handbooks that provide for severance:  I once ran into a situation where a startup company had an employee handbook (not all small startups have those, but this one had about 150 employees) that provided for 2 weeks severance upon termination for all employees.  Yikes.  Again, an unattractive restriction.  I know, I am sounding callous.

The general rule is that employees are “employees at-will”, which means that they can be fired any time (except for reasons related to a protected class like race, religion, sex, national origin, etc.) and can quit at any time as well.  An employment contract alters the “at-will” norm as does a handbook that provides for severance.  Again, it might sound a little callous, but these provisions cause problems often.

As the Godfather might say “Make sure that you can get rid of people without a mess.”

Enjoy the weekend.

 

Reblog – “Taking Control: Due Diligence on Your Terms”

Hey, Happy Thanksgiving!

Just read a great post by Brad Svrluga (High Peaks Venture Partners) on how to best prepare in advance for the typically painful process of VC due diligence.  Thorough analysis that takes some of the mystery out of the process.  Enjoy it here.

Enjoy your holiday.  Thx.

Management Carve Out Plan – Added Thought

In my earlier post on management carve out plans (see it here), I gave a detailed description of what these plans are and why boards of VC-backed companies often use them.

Recall from the prior post that an executive’s allocation from the carve out pool is normally reduced by the value of that executive’s equity (if any) at the time of the change of control triggering the carve out payment.  This is to make sure that the executive does not double dip (i.e., get both the carve out amount and the equity value; I guess double dipping is only for VCs that have participating preferred stock 🙂 ).  Said another way, the carve out is an insurance policy that pays out when the executive’s equity is not worth enough (or nothing at all).

I recently was discussing a management carve out plan with another board member.  He brought up the good point that in addition to reducing the carve out allocation by equity value it would also make sense to reduce it by the value of any “signing” or change of control bonus that the acquiring company is paying to the executive.  I can clearly see why this would make sense in many instances (not all instances to be sure, but many).  For example, in the worst scenario, an executive might low ball an exit value knowing that he was getting a fat signing bonus from the acquiring company.  This is obviously a pretty cynical view point, but none the less worth considering.

Enjoy the weekend.

Convertible Debt – Discount or Warrant Coverage?

I am on the Campus to Campus back from NYC to Ithaca.  Smooth ride so far (better than the 6 hour trek on the way down yesterday).

I just read a very interesting article about how to best structure convertible debt rounds.  Typically, with convertible debt, the note holder expects the debt to convert into the next equity financing (often a Series A round).  And, typically, the note holder is given a discount on the conversion price.  For example, if the discount is 15%, then if the Series A round priced at $1 a share, the note holders would convert their debt (plus accrued interest) at $.85 a share (just divide the debt amount plus interest by $.85).   So, the debt holder ends up with Series A stock with a $1 value (and usually a 1X liquidation preference, in this hypo $1) for $.85.   Fairly, the convertible debt holder has been rewarded for taking the extra risk of bridging the company to the Series A round.  Below I refer to this fair risk incentive as the “reward”.

The article I just read, however, argues strongly that the convertible debt holder, and, more importantly, the new Series A investors, would be better off if the convertible debt had warrant coverage instead of a conversion discount.  Such a structure shifts the cost of the convertible debt “reward” to the founders and away from the Series A investors, which, if you think about is, eminently fair.  The article proves the point with math examples.

Here is the article.  Conversion Discount vs Warrant Coverage

Worth reading and seriously considering……

Change of Control Vesting Acceleration

I am a big fan of change of control option vesting acceleration, particularly for the executive team.  I am probably not in the majority of VCs on this topic.    Quick background:

1.  Normally employee options vest over 4 years, with 25% vesting after year 1 and then the balance pro rata (monthly or quarterly) over the remaining 3 years.

2.  When a VC prices an investment transaction, it normally treats all options as “outstanding” for purposes of determining the number of shares outstanding (in order to divide into the pre-money valuation to determine a share price).

3.  Often times with an executive, he will bargain for change of control vesting acceleration, meaning that on a sale of the company, his vesting accelerates so that he can exercise all his options (if they are in the money) immediately prior to the sale event and “score” a larger return in the sale event (shareholders get paid in a sale event, and if you own more shares you get more $$).

4.  Typically, a company’s stock option plan will provide that if options are NOT assumed by the acquiring company that they accelerate and then terminate if not exercised immediately prior to the sale event.  This allows the acquiror to NOT be burdened with employee options of the selling company.  Note that if the acquiror so chooses to assume the options (and the assumption terms are up to the boards to agree on and very flexible), then they do not accelerate.   This allows the acquiror to fold in the new employees into the its company on option terms that line up well with its existing employee base.

5.  Going public does NOT equal a change of control.  No acceleration on going public.

So, personally, I like vesting acceleration on a change of control for the executive team.  Last I checked, we VCs love it when a portfolio company is sold for a tidy profit.  And we VCs know that a sale is not possible without the management team making an incredible effort.  And we know that the options will be worthless unless our liquidation preferences are cleared.  So, let’s reward the team for a job well done – accelerate the options and let them participate to a greater extent.  After all, we treated those options as outstanding when we originally priced our investment…….

Also, I like simple.  Single trigger acceleration is simple, with the trigger being the change of control itself.  Double trigger is tricky to implement.  With double trigger acceleration the 2 triggers required are (i) the change of control and (ii) the executive being fired without cause or leaving for good reason within a set period of time (often 1 year) after the change of control.  I have never seen double trigger provisions implemented easily for the following reason – if the second trigger is tripped, and the executive’s options in the acquired company accelerate, what does the executive get?  Typically, the acquired company is gone and its shareholders have been paid in the acquisition.  Where would the funding come from to compensate the executive for the value of his exercised options?  Not from the already paid former shareholders.  This is a challenging problem and one that I don’t like to create.

Finally, I have also seen plenty of situations where an executive’s options accelerate 50% (or some other %) on a change of control, which means that 50% of the unvested options would accelerate.   That is fine and easy to implement.  This is particularly useful if you don’t want to bestow a windfall on an executive that has not been with the company for a subtantial time period prior to the change of control.  For example, the vesting provisions could provide for 50% acceleration if the executive has been with the company for less than 2 years, 75% acceleration for between 2 and 3 years and 100% if greater than 3.  That progressive acceleration is still simple to implement.

Bottom line:  I like acceleration for executives and like to keep it simple and understandable.